In 1998, it was time for the country's second election, and many observ¬ers were pessimistic about the chances for democracy aftei the tumultuous events of 1997. Funcinpec's network was also in tatters as many of its representatives had either left the country, been murdered or switched allegiances in a bid for political survival. To contest the elections the opposition formed an alliance called the National United Front (NUF), which brought together Funcinpec and the Sam Rainsy Party, but it was politically expedient rather than personally excellent.
The election result reinforced the reality that the GPP was now the dominant force in the Cambodian political system, but it lacked the two-thirds majority required to govern alone. The opposition cried foul and the subsequent stand-off again plunged Cambodia into a crisis of confidence. As the opposition escalated its campaign for democracy, mass demonstrations began in the capital, which soon descended into rioting, fighting and repression.
King Sihanouk eventually negotiated a settlement, which ended with business as usual, a much-weakened Funcinpec agreeing to govern with a now dominant CPP. The formation of a new coalition government allowed the politicians to once more concentrate on bringing an end to the civil war.

On 25 December Hun Sen received the Christmas present he had been waiting for: Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea were defecting to the government side. The international community began to pile on the pressure for the establishment of some sort of war-crimes tribunal to try the remaining Khmer Rouge leadership.
After lengthy negotiations, agreement was finally reached on the composition of a court to try the surviving leaders of the Khmer Rouge. The CPP was suspicious of a UN-administered trial as the UN had sideJ with the Khmer Rouge-dominated coalition against the government in Phnom Penh and the ruling party wanted a major say in who was to be tried for what. The UN for its part rightly doubted that the judiciary in Cambodia was sophisticated or impartial enough to fairly oversee such a major trial. A compromise solution - a mixed tribunal of three international and four Cambodian judges requiring a super majority of two plus three for a verdict - was eventually agreed upon.

This elaborate process was blown apart with the dramatic UN decision to pull out of the process in early 2002, but it now looks like a trial will,finally go ahead, as a budget has been approved. What a pity that it comes 25 years too late, when many of the protagonists have already passed away, and that it will only try the limited leadership rather than get to the bottom of the who, how and whys that a truth and reconciliation commission might have untangled.